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Abstract
This paper outlines the relation between philosophy of informa-
tion (PI) and human information behavior (HIB). In this paper, we ﬁrst
brieﬂy outline the basic constructs and approaches of PI and HIB. We ar-
gue that a strong relation exists between PI and HIB, as both are explor-
ing the concept of information and premise information as a fundamen-
tal concept basic to human existence. We then exemplify that a heuristic
approach to PI integrates the HIB view of information as a cognitive hu-
man-initiated process by presenting a speciﬁc cognitive architecture for
information initiation based on modular notion from HIB/evolutionary
psychology and the vacuum mechanism from PI.
Introduction
Many disciplines are grappling with the concept of information in the
information age. Researchers in library and information science (LIS) are
using tools from hermeneutics, cybernetics, and semiotics to deﬁne its
parameters and nature (Herold, 2001). However, there is also a need to
examine the subject from a broader perspective, as Herold (2001) suggests
within the emerging ﬁeld called philosophy of information (PI).
As well as providing LIS with a broader perspective on the question of
information, PI provides an alternative to LIS’s reliance on computer sci-
ence and its diverse theoretical orientations such as the philosophy of com-
puter science, the philosophy of computing or computation, the philoso-
phy of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), etc. (Floridi, 2002b). The primary
proponent of PI is Floridi (2002a, b). Floridi argues that AI acted as a “Tro-
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jan horse,” bringing a computational/informational paradigm into philos-
ophy (i.e., with its own subjects, methods, and models, and its own perspec-
tive on traditional philosophical concepts such as the mind, consciousness,
experience, knowledge, truth, etc. (Bynum & Moor, 1998). As a result of
AI, information “acquired the nature of a primary phenomenon” (Floridi,
2002b). However, in PI, information, not AI’s primary concept computa-
tion, becomes the more fundamental concept.
Our paper discusses the relationship between PI and human informa-
tion behavior (HIB), which is a developing perspective in LIS. A strong
relation exists between PI and HIB, as both explore the concept of infor-
mation as a fundamental human concept that deﬁnes human existence and
gives life meaning. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the HIB perspective or ap-
proach facilitates the occurrence of LIS’s role as applied PI, as suggested
by Herold (2001) and Floridi (2002a).
As an applied form of PI, the HIB perspective in LIS should concern
itself with the design of services and systems that facilitate the role of infor-
mation in human existence. In effect, this widens information retrieval (IR)
design’s traditional emphasis on the focused information seeking/search-
ing behavior of individuals, predominantly in the school or workplace. The
Internet and its ability to offer information to a wide range of people at
work, school, but most importantly at home, have widened LIS’s deﬁnition
of its role to the home information situation as well—for example, the seek-
ing of health information that is widely available on the Web. Other forms
of home information-seeking behavior, such as surﬁng the Web without real
purpose and with constantly shifting tactical goals, are widening LIS’s deﬁ-
nition of its role still further (e.g., Spink et al., in press).
HIB looks at the entire human condition, thus expanding information
and its role in human life to its widest possible level. Why do we seek infor-
mation all the time, often without apparent reason, often without even
being aware of it, seemingly for its own sake? HIB answers the question by
linking the human condition and information together. Information and
information acquisition are seen as fundamental to human existence, en-
abling us to constantly adapt so that we can survive in an ever-changing
physical and social environment (Spink & Cole, in press). This broad, fun-
damental perspective makes HIB the ideal LIS perspective through which
the tenets and theoretical constructs of PI can be applied to theoretical and
real-world information-related problems.
In this article, we link the basic constructs and approaches of PI to
parallel constructs in HIB. We further argue that a heuristic approach to
PI should account for and integrate the HIB view of information as a cog-
nitive human-initiated process. We then provide an example of an HIB
approach to information as a human-initiated cognitive process, based on
HIB’s developing modular approach to human information/cognitive ar-
chitecture.
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PI
Floridi’s approach to a PI starts from the view that information in the
information age has become “a concept as fundamental and philosophi-
cally important as ‘being,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘life,’ ‘intelligence,’ ‘meaning,’ or
‘moral good and evil.’ All these pivotal concepts are interdependent with
information and are equally worthy of autonomous investigation” (Floridi,
2002a). Therefore, Floridi (2002a) suggests that such a fundamental con-
cept requires a new ﬁeld of research.
Floridi deﬁnes the emerging ﬁeld of PI research as the “philosophical
ﬁeld concerned with (a) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature
and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilization, and
sciences and (b) the elaboration and application of information-theoretic
and computational methodologies to philosophical problems” (Floridi,
2002b, p. 137). Included in (a) and (b) is a prescriptive function: “PI is
prescriptive about, and legislates on, what may count as information, and
how information should be adequately created, processed, managed, and
used” (Floridi, 2002a, p. 44).
Information’s Conceptual Nature in PI
For information’s conceptual nature in a PI, Floridi gives basic princi-
ples of information and its role in the human condition. For our present
purposes, we deﬁne the human condition as the set of human needs and
the consequences that occur as a result of those needs. According to Flori-
di (2002b), the human mind “needs to make sense of its environment by
continuously investing data (affordances) with meaning” (p. 129). Floridi
gives reasons for this need that we will not go into here. The process through
which humans make meaning out of our physical world is set off by four
conceptual thrusts.
• A metasemanticization of human narrative by putting oneself into the
narrative.
• A sharing of the narrative with others through language and other in-
formation entities like documents.
• A dephysicalization of nature whereby the physical world is virtualized
when we include it, and all the objects in it, in the narrative. We ﬁrst
manipulate objects by manipulating their virtual form in the narrative.
• A hypostatization (embodiment) of the concepts, in the narrative, we
devise to explain reality, making them as real, in the narrative, as objects
from the physical world.
Information, deﬁned as meaningful data (Floridi, 2002b), plays a predom-
inant role in these four conceptual thrusts, creating three “dynamics” or
subsidiary processes by which the conceptual thrusts are carried out. This
includes what are called “information life cycles,” or the stages “through
which information can pass, from its initial occurrence to its ﬁnal utiliza-
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tion. . . .” (Floridi, 2002b, p. 138). Floridi mentions brieﬂy, when citing
Dummett (1993, p. 186), that information, because it is partly a perceptu-
al process, may start “without one’s necessarily having a grasp of the prop-
osition which embodies it.”
LIS as Applied PI
Floridi (2002a) outlines the role LIS can play in applying the PI’s con-
ceptual principles by ﬁrst indicating LIS’s evolution toward a view of infor-
mation and the role that information plays that is similar to the history of
philosophy, and its evolution toward PI. In the history of philosophy, infor-
mation has become a more fundamental concept than knowledge, and this
due to a long line of philosophers beginning in the seventeenth century
who made the switch from focusing on the nature of the knowledge ob-
ject—i.e., metaphysics—to the relation between object and knowing sub-
ject—i.e., epistemology.
Floridi (2002a) outlines a similar switch in LIS, relying on Shera (1961).
Social epistemology (SE), argues Shera, is divided into the Sociology of
Knowledge (SoK) and the Epistemology of Social Knowledge (ESK). LIS
emphasizes the latter, which is the “critical and conceptual study of the social
(multi-agents) dimensions of knowledge” (Floridi, 2002a, p. 39). Shera
believed that LIS is the discipline that manages knowledge, but particular-
ly “the way in which knowledge is disseminated through a society and in-
ﬂuences group behavior” (Shera, 1961). Shera believed that the role of LIS
was an applied ESK.
Floridi (2002a), however, believes a conﬂict exists between ESK, which
is knowledge-centric, and LIS, which is actually information sources-cen-
tered. He describes the difference as LIS being concerned with the role
of information sources in enabling knowledge to occur. Floridi, follow-
ing Herold (2001), believes that because ESK is knowledge-centric rath-
er than information-centric, therefore, PI would be a better philosophi-
cal home for LIS.
Since Brookes (1980), LIS has used Popper’s (1975) Three Worlds
concept to describe a more general theory of information exchange. Brieﬂy,
Popper’s notion of Three Worlds describes the problem solver grasping for
understanding (World 2) of the physical world (World 1) to produce the
concepts and ideas that make up knowledge about that physical world in
recorded documents (World 3). It also works the other way, describing a
person’s interaction with World 3 in books and documents to acquire in-
formation/knowledge about the physical world (World 1).
Before LIS focused on the production, organization, and dissemination
(distribution) of recorded information, primarily document production,
organization, and delivery. The beneﬁt of making information fundamen-
tal is that it recognizes the two positions mentioned by Shera and the two
forces that remain in LIS. First, the social production and distribution of
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information. Second, the individual’s psychological acquisition and produc-
tion of information. By making information fundamental for survival, they
join at one point.
The traditional perspective has the observer examining World 1. How-
ever, the place of previous work on the part of the world this observer is
examining has become paramount. The researcher ﬁnds some sort of prob-
lem in World 1 for which he or she wishes to do more research. The re-
searcher ﬁrst goes to the literature to investigate the problem (World 3).
The process or stages whereby the problem solver reaches for an under-
standing of World 1 via recorded knowledge is theoretically deﬁned by
Popper (1975) in his schema of conjectures and refutations:
P1 >> TT >> EE >> P2 and repeat until problem solved . . .
P1 is a conceptualization of the problem. In the Popper schema, the
problem solver begins with a conceptualization of the problem (P1), then
interacts with the world of information objects (World 3), including text,
to arrive at a state of understanding, a conjecture, or tentative theory (TT)
about the problem and its solution. In the ﬁnal stage of the schema, the
problem solver tests the conjecture for error elimination (EE) before ar-
riving at a revised conceptualization of the problem (P2). The problem
solver repeats this process until the problem is either solved or he/she quits
the problem.
The problem Popper’s schema poses is the ﬁrst round conceptualiza-
tion of the problem (P1), which results from the person interacting with
both World 1 and the objectiﬁcation of theories, concepts, and principles
from the human study of World 1 in the human knowledge record (World
3). In Herold’s (2001) description, the preproblem actualization state and
information is pre- or a-categorical:
Information is: A-categorical. Information happens without pre-deﬁni-
tion into certain or rigid structures, orders, or classes in any exclusive
or preferred way. Information is rich in potential taxonomies and ca-
pable of varying interpretation schematically, while at the same time
conditional and dependent in the sense of not having an assigned ﬁnal
status. (p. 1)
Both PI and HIB look at and comment on the information problem con-
ceptualizing stage through a perspective of theories, concepts, and princi-
ples that offer LIS solutions to users’ information problems:
• The PI principle of human sense-making that drives the individual to
invest unmeaningful data in the environment with meaning, but in HIB
it also has the evolutionary function of enabling human adaptation to
changes in the environment (signaled by data in the environment that
has not been previously invested with meaning) for purposes of ensur-
ing human survival.
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• The concept of information being a process (Buckland, 1991), the in-
stantiation of which is started by some sort of interaction with the envi-
ronment (Popper’s World 1), or recorded knowledge or other informa-
tion objects (Popper’s World 3); this process can be divided into phases
(in HIB, e.g., Popper’s [1975] schema of conjectures and refutations),
stages, or cycles (in PI, cf. Floridi, 2002b, p. 138).
• The shared PI-HIB concept of a data-information-knowledge continu-
um to describe the whole range of HIB, with data being more impor-
tant in the early, conceptualization phase of human meaning creation
(PI), problem solving, and adaptation to new or transformed features
of the environment (HIB), and knowledge being more important in the
later phase of meaning-knowledge production and human adaptation
to the environment, for example, in Popper’s (1975) EE phase in his
schema of conjectures and refutations (described above) where a re-
searcher’s conjecture is tested before it is placed by the researcher in
the knowledge canon.
• The HIB principle of uncertainty, an information theoretic concept
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949), but increasingly used in LIS by Kuhlthau
(1993) and Wilson et al. (2002).
To develop this issue further, the next section of the paper discusses and
extends the Spink and Cole (2002) uniﬁed theory of HIB as the human-in-
formation basis for the application of principles and concepts from PI.
Unified Theory of HIB
The Spink and Cole (in press) uniﬁed theory of HIB provides a basis
for applying PI theories, concepts, and principles to LIS methods and prac-
tice, particularly the methods and practice of creating systems to facilitate
user access to information via IR systems.
The Spink and Cole HIB theory integrates the four principal LIS in-
formation approaches that framework user information-seeking: the user
as problem solver, sense-maker, everyday life information-seeker, and infor-
mation forager; HIB accomplishes the integration by using theories, con-
cepts, and principles from evolutionary psychology to widen the tradition-
al LIS perspective to a perspective on the total human information
condition.
The principles and issues that have arisen from recent advances in evo-
lutionary psychology widen the traditional LIS focus on information-seek-
ing and problem-solving, not only by indicating that other forms of HIB are
ignored by the current LIS information-seeking paradigm, but also by set-
ting a prehistorical framework for the human information condition, one
that operates as a constant throughout the history of human-information
interaction. The most important implication of the evolutionary psycholo-
gy perspective, however, is its elevation in status of information need from
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a secondary to a fundamental human need, due to the primacy that evolu-
tionary psychology gives to information foraging for human adaptation and
survival.
The Spink and Cole HIB theory utilizes the evolutionary psychology
perspective on the human condition to integrate four information-seeking
approaches. The integrated theory of HIB attempts to be a global, more
fundamental theory of information behavior, in which the four current
information science information behavior approaches ﬁnd their place as
part of a description of the human “information condition.”
The Spink and Cole HIB theory is based on some sort of human state
(preattentional, a problem state, a need state, etc.) being actualized by
uncertainty, which acts as an energy input moving the human state along a
“data-information-knowledge” continuum. High uncertainty is linked to a
preattentional state of information foraging for adaptation and survival,
while low uncertainty is linked to information behaviors whose purpose is
knowledge (e.g., the common sense precepts by which most of us live in
everyday life, or make sense of life).
The next section of the paper discusses the implications of HIB’s ad-
aptation of evolutionary psychology’s modular cognitive architecture on
HIB and PI.
Implications of Modular Cognitive Architecture
on HIB Processes
Modular: Metaphor: The Process of Information Acquisition in Evolutionary
Psychology
Homo sapiens are unique among species in their ability to think sym-
bolically, representing the world around them in terms of symbolic imag-
es. This ability allows us to think in the past and to think about, even plan
and therefore inﬂuence, our future. The ability to control our destiny
through predictive thinking gives us a decided advantage in terms of sur-
vival and adaptation to a changing environment.
Two views are taken about how we evolved to our present state: (a) that
our ability to represent the world symbolically was gradual, created by cul-
ture or (b) that 30,000 to 50,000 years ago a chance mutation occurred in
human cognition that led to a sudden change in how we were hard-wired,
giving us the ability to think in symbolic representations (Mithen, 1996, p.
42); this, in turn, led to our transformation from being one among many
species competing for limited resources to a species so clever that it is now
almost a “geological force” in the world (Wilford, 2002). We take the sec-
ond view in this article, that a dramatic revolution in human cognition re-
sulted from a chance mutation occurring in our cognitive apparatus some
30,000–50,000 years ago that established the way humans think and con-
duct HIBs up to the present day.
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The chance mutation led to the human ability to think representation-
ally, or symbolically, leading to language, art, religion, information behav-
ior, and eventually science. It also allowed humans to think in the past,
construct problem solutions over time in the present, and think into the
future, via these representations. These representations also allowed hu-
mans to predict behavior based on past experiences. The ways these repre-
sentations were constructed induced Homo sapiens to engage in a certain
kind of information behavior that we will broadly deﬁne here as (a) infor-
mation behavior for some immediate purpose and (b) information behav-
ior for no immediate purpose, but which, in the context of our hunter-gath-
erer ancestor, allowed Homo sapiens to adapt their behavior and survive.
It does this through its cognitive architecture, which has several important
features according to modular theorists.
The ﬁrst feature is that the cognitive architecture is designed to be
adaptive. Essential to the notion of adaptation for survival is the ability to
transform your way of thinking so that in effect you see the world or at least
a part of the world differently, which means that information acquisition is
controlled by a cognitive architecture that can be described as a generative
system (Boden, 1998). Tooby and Cosmides (1992) describe a modular
architecture capable of generating new information about the subtle kinds
of issues related to social interaction, by combining together from dispar-
ate pieces of nonpurposive data both consciously and unconsciously col-
lected by the hunter-gatherer over the course of time. The architecture must
be able to bring these ﬂoating pieces of data together, perhaps because of
an entirely new stimulus that causes them to come together (Renfrew, 1998),
resulting in the production of a transformed or new way of looking at the
world, adaptation, and increased chances of survival.
Lake (1998) divides these adaptations into both improbable and im-
possible transformations. An example of improbabilist learning or associ-
ation (Renfrew, 1998) is the transformation of the hunter-gatherer’s use of
the horse as a food source to using it as traction or transportation. This
occurred sometime before 1200 B.C. when we ﬁrst see these representations
depicted in artifacts. Before this time, the horse was domesticated as a
source of food, and oxen pulled the carts. Funerals in complex hunter-
gatherer societies were used as social messaging events, to create alliances
“by advertising the success of the deceased’s kin group” (Schulting, 1998).
The change in using the horse from food to mode of traction occurred as
a result of funeral ceremonies where horses were used to pull ceremonial
carts with the bodies of rich men to indicate to other members of the group
the rich man’s social position.
Based on impossibilist learning or association, Bradley (1998) believes
that the change in funeral monuments from monuments that did not re-
quire the alteration of the natural state of the raw materials used—like using
boulders or large rocks that required only accurate planning and measure-
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ment to transport them to the site and position them—to where the raw
material itself was modiﬁed, constituted a radical transformation in the
structure of man’s relationship with nature and the natural world.
In the evolutionary psychology view of human development and behav-
ior we take here, what allowed improbabilist and impossiblist learning or
change to occur was a chance genetic mutation 30,000–50,000 years ago,
which caused a change in the hard-wiring of Homo sapiens. Mithen (1996)
hypothesizes about the effect of this chance mutation. He believes, essen-
tially, that the various intelligence modules of the Homo sapiens cognitive
apparatus, formerly separated and independent, suddenly developed an
integration mechanism that allowed knowledge and memory data from one
module to ﬂow into another.
Integration Mechanism in Modular Thinking
The mechanism of creating symbolic markings is due to, according to
Mithen’s thesis, the modular architecture of human intelligence. Because
of this architecture, the various types of thinking have their own separate
modules (made up of module speciﬁc rules and memory links). Mithen
(1996) hypothesizes that the Homo sapiens cognitive mechanism is divid-
ed into four intelligence modules, each in charge of a certain kind of in-
telligence cognition, but all connected to a general intelligence base (con-
taining general-purpose learning and decision-making rules). The four
Mithen intelligence modules are
• a technical intelligence module (tool making, technology);
• a linguistic intelligence module (language acquisition and use);
• a social intelligence module (group dynamics, Machiavellian behavior,
empathetic behavior); and
• a natural history intelligence module (about animals, plants, and geog-
raphy; mental maps and hunting behavior).
According to one theory, some chance mutation in human cognitive
architecture, called the Big Bang, allowed data or information to ﬂow be-
tween the modules, creating a type of metaphorical thinking (as data or
information from the sender module would, by deﬁnition, be metaphori-
cal or introduce metaphorical thinking of some sort to the destination
module in this ﬂow). The modular notion of cognitive architecture and the
ﬂow of data from one module into another, when seeking information for
adaptation and survival, are based on broad deﬁnition of metaphor as in-
volving all types of human thinking that transform unmeaningful data in
the environment into meaningful information.
Metaphorical Thinking
The current research approaches in LIS are largely attentional—that
is, they assume that even if we are passively seeking information, we are
paying attention to the stimuli on some level, like acquiring information
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while watching TV or aimlessly surﬁng the Internet. Evolutionary psycholo-
gy, on the other hand, posits a type of information foraging where informa-
tion is acquired without attending to it. Perhaps unattended-to information
or data is somehow attached to other information we are attending to. This
may be the basis of what we have termed here “metaphorical thinking.”
In effect, all representational thinking and communication are meta-
phorical. When we attempt to represent reality using symbolic forms, like
a cartographic mapping of a geographical area, the representational nature
of the symbols used to achieve this is necessarily metaphorical—i.e., the blue
color used to indicate an ocean, a line to represent the coastline and the
green color used on the other side of the line to indicate land; all these
symbols are metaphors trying to represent the actual physical form.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that “the essence of metaphor is
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”
Metaphors are not mental models. However, metaphors are an important
phase between intuitive model formation and mental models (Hill & Lev-
enhagen, 1995), allowing us to ﬁll in missing details in our comprehension
of a concept, event, or object (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). They thus help us
to bridge the gap between what we do and do not know (Hill & Levenhagen,
1995). Metaphors can form a link between left- and right-brain thought, or
theory-in-use and theory.
Metaphor Priming the Pump
In the Spink and Cole HIB theory, we used a continuum of data-infor-
mation-knowledge, and the image of a tap and uncertainty/water energiz-
ing a pump that drives the mental state of information user into data for-
aging mode, an information-seeking mode or a knowledge creation mode
of HIB. Metaphor causes superordinate category instantiation, like prim-
ing a pump, creating new properties to ﬂow from its home module to the
topic module. The topic module is the module that is controlling the at-
tention of the individual at the moment the pump is primed by metaphor-
ical or intermodular data ﬂow. Suddenly, the person’s acategorical think-
ing (deﬁned by Herold [2001] and cited above) assumes some category
deﬁnition as a result of this ﬂow, but it would probably, we assume, be a
superordinate category of some kind that jump starts topic category forma-
tion based on a sudden information process, which is, in turn, based on this
category conceptualization process—i.e., there is an inclusion, or class in-
clusion process mechanism connected to the process (Glucksberg et al.,
1997). It does this by promoting abstractions rather than speciﬁcity (cf. also,
Lowenstein et al., 1999).
After the metaphor priming of the pump occurs, we assume that the
result of the process is that the superordinate category and the abstraction
of the category effectuated by the process create a structure containing the
following:
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1. Dimensions of category (Glucksberg et al., 1997).
2. It provides relevance criteria.
3. Therefore, it provides relevance dimensions for subsequent information
seeking, search, and use.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to describe the relationship between
HIB and PI. Extending our theory of HIB, we discuss what occurs when,
based on modular cognitive architecture and evolutionary psychology the-
oretic principles, a person’s information behavior and thinking mechanism
leads to adaptation of the human organism to new or unmeaningful data
in the environment for the purpose of ensuring survival in the environment.
In this type of behavior, the human gathers or forages for data constantly,
without awareness, and for no purpose other than adaptation to the envi-
ronment for survival. So the person is very sensitive to the environment as
this behavior is constant and does not demand attentional mechanisms
needed for other types of more search-oriented information behavior.
According to one theory, the Big Bang in human thinking allowed the
interﬂowing of modular data from one module to the other, thus creating
the ability for human metaphorical thinking. In this article, we have attempt-
ed to describe how metaphorical thinking causes this interﬂow, leading to
the facilitation of human adaptation to changes in the environment. We
assume that this process, or something like this process, underlies all orig-
inal thinking in both the human species and at the level of the individual
human organism—i.e., modular and metaphorical thinking is the mecha-
nism that allows the single individual to survive by adapting in the group
and in his/her environmental framework.
References
Boden, M. A. (1998). What is creativity? In S. Mithen (Ed.), Creativity in human evolution and
prehistory (pp. 22–60). London: Routledge.
Bradley, R. (1998). Architecture, imagination, and the Neolithic world. In S. Mithen (Ed.),
Creativity in human evolution and prehistory (pp. 227–240). London: Routledge.
Brookes, B. C. (1980). The foundations of information science. Part I. Philosophical aspects.
Journal of Information Science, 2, 125–133.
Buckland, M. (1991). Information as thing. Journal of the American Society for Information Science,
42(5), 351–360.
Bynum, T. W., & Moor, J. H. (Eds.). (1998). The digital phoenix: How computers are changing phi-
losophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dummett, M. (1993). Origins of analytical philosophy. London: Duckworth.
Floridi, L. (2002a). On deﬁning library and information science as applied philosophy of
information. Social Epistemology, 16(1), 37–49.
Floridi, L. (2002b). What is the philosophy of information? Metaphilosophy, 33 (1/2), 123–145.
Glucksberg, S., McGlone, M. S., & Manfredi, D. (1997). Property attribution in metaphor
comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 36, 50–67.
Herold, K. R. (2001). Librarianship and the philosophy of information. Library Philosophy and
Practice, 3(2), 1–15.
Hill, R. C., & Levenhagen, M. (1995). Metaphor and mental models: Sensemaking and sense-
628 library trends/winter 2004
giving in innovative and entrepreneurial activities. Journal of Management, 21(6), 1057–
1074.
Kuhlthau, C. C. (1993). Seeking meaning: A process approach to library and information services.
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Lake, M. (1998). Homo: The creative genus? In S. Mithen (Ed.), Creativity in human evolution
and prehistory (pp. 125–142). London: Routledge.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lowenstein, J., Thompson, L., & Gentner, D. (1999). Analogical encoding facilitates knowl-
edge transfer in negotiation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(4), 586–597.
Mithen, S. (1996). The prehistory of the mind: The cognitive origins of art, religion, and science. Lon-
don: Thames and Hudson.
Popper, K. R. (1975). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Renfrew, C. (1998). All the King’s horses: Assessing cognitive maps in later prehistoric Europe.
In S. Mithen (Ed.), Creativity in human evolution and prehistory (pp. 260–284). London:
Routledge.
Schulting, R. J. (1998). Creativity’s cofﬁn: Innovation in the burial record of Mesolithic Eu-
rope. In S. Mithen (Ed.), Creativity in human evolution and prehistory (pp. 203–226). Lon-
don: Routledge.
Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication. In The
mathematical theory of evidence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shera, J. H. (1961). What is librarianship? Louisiana Library Association Bulletin, 24, 95–97.
Spink, A., & Cole, C. (2002). Towards an evolutionary understanding of everyday life infor-
mation seeking. HBES 2002: International Conference on Human Behavior and Evolution, June
19–23, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.
Spink, A., & Cole, C. (in press). Human information behavior: Integrating information use and var-
ious approaches.
Spink, A., Koricich, A., Jansen, B. J., & Cole, C. (in press). Sexual information seeking on Web
search engines. CyberPsychology and Behavior.
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. H. Barkow,
L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the genera-
tion of culture (pp. 19–136). New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilford, J. N. (2002). When humans became human. New York Times, Tuesday, February 26, 2002,
D1, D5.
Wilson, T. D., Ford, N., Ellis, D., Foster, A., & Spink, A. (2002). Information seeking and me-
diated searching. Part 2. Uncertainty and its correlates. Journal of the American Society for
Information Science and Technology, 53(9), 704–715.
